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Abstract TTiis article presents a model of commercial fishing in a stochastic envi-
ronment that focuses on the labor-employment contract. In a partial equilibrium
context, the authors show that when boat owners and crew members are risk-averse,
crop sharing is the optimal contract, and the resultant labor employment level will be
greater than with a (suboptimal) wage contract. Industry effects and steady-state
resource growth limitations are introduced into a market equilibrium model. In this
extended model, market equilibria will also involve sharing contracts. These will
result in greater employment, which comes at the expense of reduced resource stocks
and higher-than-necessary harvesting costs. The article also examines how industry
regulation such as licensing, quotas, and subsidies will differ if the prevailing con-
tract is cropsharing as compared with a wage. Despite the fact that cropsharing
contracts are privately optimal in a regulated setting, they may not be socially opti-
mal.
Keywords Wage contracts, crop-sharing contracts, equilibrium, fisheries.
Introduction
In economics literature, increasing attention is being paid to the structure, efficiency, and
implementation of contracts whereby agents agree to share the costs and benefits of an
activity. Although most analyses focus on contracts arising in the industrial organization,
tabor, and agriculture literatures, such agreements are also very important for natural
resource markets. In most instances, formal sharing contracts define the responsibilities
and payoffs of parties to the contracts. The terms of these contracts as well as their
ultimate efficiency and stability properties usually depend on the relative bargaining
strengths of the agents (which may be related to resource ownership), the existence of
pure market alternatives and the extent to which the agents have (possibly different)
information about each other and the often uncertain economic environment.
In this article we consider the structure, efficiency, and stability of wage and crop-
sharing contracts that arise between boat owners and crew members in fisheries. Typi-
cally, these crop sharing contracts are defined by two parameters: an internal wage rate
for crew, which may differ from the market wage, and a sharing rate for distributing
realized revenue. These parameters vary from fishery to fishery, and the extreme cases
of pure sharing and pure wage contracts, although less frequent, are sometimes ob-
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served.' In part, our work draws on the initial studies of Sutinen (1975, 1979, 1983), in
which, for a stochastic environment, it was argued that crop-sharing contracts always
dominate wage contracts. The long-held deterministic counterpart of this result is that
resource allocation is independent of the form of contract (see Cheung 1970; Anderson
1982). In fact, Anderson (1982, 448) concluded that "the existence of a share system
will have no effect on the economically efficient level of output," and "if the share rate
is market determined, optimal regulation policy drawn from the traditional model is
appropriate." Sutinen's work has important implications for the design and implementa-
tion of fisheries management policies given that the traditional approach to policy has
been to assume that pure wage contracts hold in the fishery. This policy approach has
been guided by the assumption of wage contracts present in most theoretical research in
replenishable resource economics.
One feature of Sutinen's work is that it considers only the private optimum of boat
owners and crew. Neither the output market equilibrium nor the biological (steady-state)
equilibrium of the resource is considered. As well, distortions arising from regulatory
policy are not considered. When these features are introduced into the analysis, several
important results emerge. In the case where there is no regulation, the equilibrium return
to firms is independent of the choice of contract. By way of contrast, in regulated
markets, there are realistic situations in which wage contracts may be dominant to the
extent that they lead to higher returns to firms in the fishery. In both the regulated and
unregulated cases, however, we show that decentralized contracting on the part of agents
may lead to only sharing contracts being implemented. In a situation where n-1 firms
offer wage contracts, it is always optimal (as Sutinen's approach suggested) in an unreg-
ulated environment for the n"" firm to offer a sharing contract, implying that wage
contracts do not lead to a Nash equilibrium. Important implications for output, employ-
ment, and the role of regulation in the fishery arise when the crop-sharing Nash equilib-
rium in a regulated setting is not optimal.^
This article has the following structure. Throughout the study we work with a mean-
variance model.' In the next section we introduce the model and point out Sutinen's
results, which serve as benchmarks for what follows. An interesting result concerning
the separability of contract selection and factor employment decisions is demonstrated.
In the following section we consider the contracting problem in a full stochastic
bioeconomic industry equilibrium setting. The last two sections consider issues related
to contracting in a regulated environment and offer brief conclusions.
Before turning to the analysis contained in this study, it is useful to contrast briefly
the share-contracting fisheries literature with the other contracting literature noted
above. Although fisheries contract models exhibit some similarities to those arising in
the principal/agent, implicit contract and agricultural crop-sharing literature, significant
differences exist that make these models inappropriate for analyzing equilibrium contract
formation in fisheries. One immediate difference is the need to introduce the notion of
biological equilibrium into fisheries models. The results that we present depend on the
characteristics of the biological equilibrium that arises. Other differences among the
literature arise from standard assumptions about the relationships between contracting
agents and the observability of economic variables in fisheries models. It is useful to
examine them briefly.
Beginning with contrasts to the standard principal/agent models, in the fishery it is
typically assumed that the information sets of all agents are identical and that behavior is
perfectly observable (cf. Holmstrom 1979; Hart 1983). A point of similarity, however, is
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tees to other agents (the crew). In contrast to assumptions in the implicit contract litera-
ture, in the fishery it is standard to assume that all parties to the contract are risk-averse.
In both kinds of literature, however, it is assumed that the agent offering the contract
(the boat owner) has complete information about the preferences of the workers (see
Grossman and Hart 1981).
Turning finally to the case of agricultural crop sharing (see, for example, Cheung
1969; Stiglitz 1974; Reid 1976), it is helpful to begin by briefly stating some of the
important results that have arisen in that literature. First, in a riskless environment with
complete markets (perfect information) and without transaction costs, it is generally
accepted that agents in an agricultural setting should be indifferent between pure wage
and pure sharing contracts. Similar deterministic results are known to hold for some
fisheries models (see, for example, Cheung 1978; Anderson 1982; Ferris and Plourde
1982).
In a stochastic environment with complete markets and perfect information but with
no transactions costs, Reid (1976) has argued that risk is not a fundamental determinant
of sharecropping: "One could argue that share cropping is observed because the tenancy
choice has no effect on the distribution of risk among factor owners, not because it
shares risk" (p. 565). However, risk sharing also motivates contract formation in the
fishery under uncertainty. Unlike in the agricultural model of Reid, fisheries contracts
involve an internal wage rate that may differ (be less than) from the (exogenous) market
determined wage rate relevant for the alternate employment of crew members. As well,
there are important differences in production processes between agricultural and fish-
eries models. For example, in typical agricultural models land can be subdivided accord-
ing to tenancy, and the productivity of labor in a given subdivision is independent of the
quantity and quality of labor in any other subdivision. In a fishery, however, a boat
cannot be similarly subdivided. As well, geographic considerations of the harvesting
process make it less likely that a given worker will be a crew member on two different
boats. In summary, the intuition and results arising in agricultural crop-sharing models
are not directly applicable to fisheries models.
The Model
Our basic model of agent behavior incorporates several features presented in Sutinen
(1979). We consider two contracting parties: the boat owner (with relevant variables
identified by subscript B), and the crew member (identified by subscript C). Incomes (4,
/c) under a sharing agreement are given by
, X) - BL (1)
/c = (1 - r)ixp{nf)fiL, x) + OL + w{T - L) (2)
In the above equations, r and 6 are the contract variables where r e (0,1] is the share
of gross realized revenue of the boat owner and 9 is an internal wage rate. When
0 < r < 1, a sharing contract arises. Alternatively, if r = 1, there is a wage contract.
We do not consider the case r = 0, where the roles of the boat owner and crew member
are reversed. Market price depends on industry output (nf), where n is the number of
boats and fiL, x) is the harvesting function dependent on the labor input of the crew
member (L) and the aggregate resource stock (x). The crew member is assumed to work
L hours at fishing and T - L (> 0) hours at an alternative employment. The alternative182 C. Plourde and J. B. Smith
employment pays a wage rate w. Uncertainty enters through the multiplicative random
term /x where ^[/x] = 1 and Var[/i] = a^. In the model, then, either demand or produc-
tion or both can be considered random.
In contrast to Sutinen's approach, we assume that boats are identical and of fixed
size and thus we do not consider optimal capital choices. This leads to no important loss
in generality for our purposes. Furthermore, we consider only two contracting parties
and thereby eliminate choice of the optimal number of crew members. Again, this is not
an important restriction on the model. The parameter 6 plays an important role in these
contracts. The sign of d is in general ambiguous except in the case where r = 1 and
6 = w because a wage contract arises. In some actual fishing situations, fuel and other
similar expenses are deducted from revenue before the shares are computed, and this
could lead to a negative value for d. As well, sometimes owners guarantee a minimum
wage (see Zoeteweij 1956).
The preferences of the boat owner and crew member (f/g, Uc) are given by the
mean-variance utility functions:
UB = E[/J - aB Var[4] (3)
Uc = We] - «c Var[/c] (4)
where (ag, a^ are parameters describing the respective distastes for income variability.
It is useful to note that Sutinen's general results regarding the optimality of sharing
contracts are independent of types and degrees of risk aversion. The preferences speci-
fied in Eqs. (3) and (4), although therefore consistent with Sutinen's general framework,
provide an analytically more tractable way of introducing risk aversion into our analysis.
Following Sutinen, we assume that the boat owner guarantees a fixed level of utility
to the worker. This assumption implies that the boat owner has an advantage over the
crew member. Given the high unemployment rate in many fishing regions, this does not
seem unreasonable. Because the riskless income level wr (guaranteed in part, perhaps,
by unemployment insurance and other social assistance programs) is always available to
the worker, we assume that the boat owner with a full knowledge of Eq. (4) guarantees
the utility level U^ = wT. The problem of the boat owner is thus to choose levels of the
intemal wage rate (6), contract parameter (r), and labor (L) so as to maximize his own
welfare subject to that of the crew member.
Formally, the problem faced by the boat owner is written:
Denoting a solution to Eq. (5) by [r*, 9*, L*], we first consider possible solutions for the
contract variable r. In particular, if r* = 1, then the only way to meet the crew con-
straint is for 0* = w. This is the pure wage contract case. If 0 < r* < 1 then the risk is
shared by the boat owner and crew members.
In order to examine solutions to Eq. (5) where (0 < r< 1) and (0 < L < 7), the
crew member's utility constraint is substituted into the objective function. Using Eqs. (2)
and (4), the crew member's constraint (Uc = wT) can be expressed:
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Equation (6) has the straightforward interpretation that the expected value of the
crew member's share (the left-hand side of Eq. (6)) must be sufficient to compensate him
for any wage differential (market versus internal) on hours worked fishing {w - 6)L
plus the risk associated with his share of the uncertain output.
Solving Eq. (6) for 6 and substituting into Eq. (5), the optimization problem takes
the form:
max UB = pf(L, x) - wL - (^^YiL, A:)[a/ + a^ - rf] (7)
Several points about Eq. (7) are noteworthy. First, the dependence of price on market
output is not stressed because firms are assumed to be price takers. (An industry analysis
is presented below.) Second, if r = 1 (and, hence, 6 = w), then (as discussed earlier)
the problem in Eq. (7) is seen to be identical to that of a competitive boat owner
maximizing expected utility by hiring labor, which is assumed to be in perfectly elastic
supply at the wage w. Third, no consideration is given to the effects of resource dy-
namics.
An interesting feature of the optimization problem in Eq. (7) is that r can be chosen
independently of L. Because ofthe structure ofthe objective function, the value of r (r*)
that maximizes Eq. (7) will be given as a solution to the problem:
D = min a^/^ + aS- - rf (8)
{'•}
where D is derived by essentially minimizing the term in square brackets in Eq. (7).
Equating the derivative in Eq. (8) to zero, the unique solution (r*) for the share of the
boat owner is given by:
/•* °^^— (9)
+
It is useful to note that r* is always between 0 and 1 that in the optimal value of the
problem in Eq. (8), D* is equal to ^^(r*)^ -I- ac(l " >'*f, which further simplifies to
agr*. Note that D* is always less than min [ag, aj- Thus, whenever production is
feasible, a share contract is optimal, because the boat owner's utility is always greater
with a sharing contract for any labor choice. Finally, the optimal share parameter r* will
be independent of market variables such as wage, price, and employment."
When Eq. (9) is introduced into Eq. (7), the boat owner's optimizing problem
reduces to
max V = pf{L, x) - wL - kpYiL, x) (10)
L
where we introduce the parameter k = a^fi* = c^aa/-*. Indeed, as Eq. (10) suggests,
the only effective difference between the crop-sharing and wage contract employment
problems is the size of the parameter k. In particular, because k is an increasing function
of r* and takes on a value of 0^0^ in the limiting case r* = I, k will always be larger184 C. Plourde and J. B. Smith
under a wage contract. Note that the wage contract case corresponds to a limiting
situation in which the crew is infinitely risk-averse.
The condition for an interior solution to Eq. (10) is
VL = PA - w - 2kp'ff, = 0 (11)
The second order condition is K,^ < 0. Using Eq. (11) and the second order condition, it
is straightforward to show by implicit differentiation that
Because (as noted above) k is an increasing function of r*, the optimal employment' and
output levels for a firm facing a given stock size will be greater under a sharing as
opposed to a wage contract. This result has been demonstrated by Sutinen.
Crop Sharing and Industry Equilibrium
An Extended Model
In this section we extend the model of the previous section to incorporate simultaneous
resource and industry (bioeconomic) equilibrium. In contrast to the conclusion of the last
section, it is shown that crop-sharing contracts do not strictly dominate wage contracts in
terms of the boat owner's payoff. Nonetheless, they will always be chosen. As well, the
comparative statics results, which now incorporate industry and resource effects, may
differ.
We begin by examining the properties of the following system of three equations
that describe a steady-state industry equilibrium:
- w - 2kp\nf)ffL = 0 (13)
Pi.nf)f - wL - kp\nf)f^ - f7 = 0 (14)
gix) - nf= 0 (15)
The variables to be determined are x, L, and n, because r* in our specification is defined
solely by preference parameters as given in Eq. (9). Equation (13) provides the condi-
tion for an interior optimum for a representative boat owner where (as noted above) the
magnitude of the parameter k distinguishes crop sharing from wage contracts. Equation
(13) differs from Eq. (11) to the extent that the dependence of market price on industry
output is emphasized by replacing p (the parametric price faced by the firm) by the
demand function/)(«/), where n is the number of (assumed identical) firms in the indus-
try and/is the production function. Equation (14) expresses the requirement that, in
equilibrium, the representative firm owner will obtain the normal utility level U. This
might be interpreted as each boat owner receiving a normal return on his risky invest-
ment in the boat. Finally, Eq. (15) presents the condition that industry output be consis-
tent with a resource steady state. The function g{x) gives the amount of resource growth
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concave and differentiabte over the interval [0, Jc] with g{o) = g(x) = 0 and g{s) > 0
for 5 e (0, J). As such, x^y = arg max gis) is the maximum sustainable yield stock size
and gix^sy) is the maximum sustainable yield. Equation (15) requires that a resource
steady-state exist with resource growth just equal to industry extraction. From the as-
sumed properties of g(x) it follows that whenever industry output is less than maximum
sustainable yield, there will be two values of x that satisfy Eq. (15). The term
bioeconomic equilibrium corresponds to values of the variables [L*, «*, x*] satisfying
the system of Eqs. (13), (14), and (15) and the second order condition:
p(nf)fLL - 2kp\nf)\ftp + /AJ < 0 (16)
Properties of Bioeconomic Equilibrium
An important observation concerning Eqs. (13)-(16) is that firms will, in principle, be
indifferent between wage and crop-sharing contracts. This result is suggested by Eq.
(14), which requires the output, price, stock, and the number of firms have adjusted so
that each firm achieves the same level of utility f7. In practice, however, only sharing
contracts will be observed. To see this, assume to the contrary that Eqs. (13)-(15) hold
with all firms adopting a wage contract with k^ = lim,,_, k = (^a^. However, any firm
is free to adopt a sharing contract with k^ = alagr* < k^. Clearly, there is an incentive
for a firm to do this because, for this firm, the left-hand side of Eq. (13) is now positive,
indicating that there are private gains to be made by increasing employment and hence
output. Of course, all firms will adopt this strategy, and L, n, and x will adjust until
marginal benefits are zero at a sharing equilibrium. Another way of stating this result is
that a pure wage contract equilibrium is not a stable Nash equilibrium.
In order to examine further the properties of the bioeconomic contract equilibrium,
it is helpful to reparameterize the model using familiar cost functions and duality results
and to introduce new aggregate functions G, H, and Fbelow. An equivalent representa-
tion of Eqs. (12)-(15) is:
p - dcldq - Ikp'q = ^ = V{q, p, x) = 0 (17)
dq
pq - c{q, X) - kp^q' - U^ H(q, p, x) = 0 (18)
g(x) - zip) = G{q, p,x) ^ 0 (19)
dVldq = d^Hldq^ < 0 (20)
In this system a bioeconomic equilibrium is given by the three variables [q*, p*, x*]
satisfying Eqs. (17)-(19) and the second order condition, Eq. (20). The demand and
production functions/7(«/),/(L, x) in Eqs. (13)-(16) have been replaced by the parame-
ters p and q respectively. Total factor costs for each output level are given by the cost
function c{q, x), which comes from solving the problem: min^ wL subject to/(L, x) = q.
Note that marginal cost (dc/dq) is equal to w/fi^. Finally, in Eq. (19) industry output (nf)
is defined by inverting the demand function to obtain nf = p''(p) = z(p) where z'(p)
< 0 whenever the demand curve is negatively sloped.186 C. Plourde and J. B. Smith
For the comparative static analysis that follows, we assume that the equilibrium of
Eqs. (17)-(20) is locally stable. The adjustment dynamics are given by:
<7 = V(g, p, x) (21)
p H{q,p,x) (22)
X = G(q, p, x) (23)
The system oftotai differential Eqs. (21)-(23) has a straightforward interpretation. The
equations describe the respective adjustments in (q, p, and x) if the equilibrium is dis-
turbed. Equation (21) is the behavioral assumption that whenever it is profitable to do
so, firms will raise (or reduce) output. Equation (22) states that industry price will fall
(or rise) whenever existing firms make greater (or less) than the normal return. This is
just the standard entry condition for competitive markets.* Finally, Eq. (23) is a biologi-
cal requirement that the stock size x will increase (decrease) whenever net growth is
positive (negative).
By the Routh-Hurwitz theorem,' the conditions for local stability can be expressed









dV 1 - 4kpq - c,
0 - q +
0 -z
(24)
In Eq. (24), dV/dq is less than zero by virtue of the second order condition given in Eq.
(20) and - dH/dq = 0 by the first order condition. As well, c,/^ and c^ are both
negative because at an equilibrium (by assumption), it cannot be more costly to harvest
(in a marginal or total sense) the more abundant is the stock. The slope of the resource
growth curve at an equilibrium {g') can, in principle, be positive, negative, or zero. If
g' > 0, then the prevailing equilibrium is inefficient in tJiat total costs could be lower
(less L employed) and the same output produced at a stock size greater than the maxi-
mum sustainable yield. It is nonetheless stable for small k.^ If g' < 0 and k is suffi-
ciently small, then if dV/dq < 0 is satisfied, all of the Routh-Hurwitz conditions will
hold, including the restriction that the Jacobian is negative {\J\ < 0). Recall that k is an
increasing function of the variance a^ (for fixed r), and thus the smaller is the variability
in IX, the more likely the industry will be (locally) stable.
















From Eq. (28) it is unambiguously the case that equilibrium stock size will be
greater the greater is it. Thus, a crop-sharing equilibrium will be associated with a
smaller stock size than a wage contract equilibrium, were it to arise. Moreover, because
k increases ceteris paribus as the variance o^ increases, stock size will be larger the
greater the variability in the random parameter (demand and/or harvesting) under either
a wage or a crop-sharing contract.
The dependence of firm output and market price on contract structure (or variability
in demand/harvesting) is ambiguous. At the market equilibrium in which q' < 0, from
Eq. (27) it follows that market price will increase with increasing uncertainty. As Eq.
(26) indicates, there is more ambiguity regarding the effect of increasing k on firm
output. Because the stock increases, it lowers average costs (cjq) and marginal costs c,^,
and the combined effect depends on the elasticity of the cost function with respect to x,
the stock. The effect on the number of firms in the industry is also ambiguous. However,
aggregate output will decline (because market price increases). Finally, individual firms
will hire less labor as uncertainty increases.
A Comment on Subsidies
Subsidies are common in the fishing industry. One form of subsidization is for govern-
ments to provide forgivable loans and subsidized borrowing rates for boat construction.
The effect of these subsidies can be studied in the context of the model of this section by
examining the dependence of the equilibrium (q*, p*, x*) on the normal return parame-
ter U. In particular, the greater is the subsidy, the smaller is the required return U.





















From Eq. (32), an increase in U unambiguously increases the stock size and there-
fore industry subsidies, which implies that a reduction in U tends to reduce the equilib-
rium stock size. This result is consistent with the argument that industry subsidies to
boat owners cause overfishing. Similarly, output price increases with increasing U
whenever there is no biological inefficiency. Price thus decreases with increasing
subsidies.' Finally, the effect of subsidies on firm output is difficult to determine. Some
insight is gained by noting that l-4kpq > 0 is just the condition that the supply curve of
a representative firm is upward sloping. Thus, whenever there is no biological ineffi-
ciency (q' < 0), output per firm increases with increasing U and thus decreases with
increasing subsidies, although industry output expands through increased entry.
Subsidies to labor also arise in fishing industries. In parts of Canada, for example,
individuals who work as crew members in fishing are entitled to more (longer duration)
unemployment benefits. Suppose that these extra benefits have a monetary value of 8.
Then, in terms of our model, the boat owner no longer has to guarantee a utility level of
wT{= U^) to crew members. Rather, the boat owner guarantees wT - 8 and the gov-
ernment makes up the difference. Note, then, that the boat owner effectively appropri-
ates some or all of these benefits. In terms of our model, it is straightforward to show
that the zero profit constraint Eq. (17) now becomes
pq - c{q, x) - U- 8 (18')
Thus, because of the contract power of the boat owner, he is able to appropriate effec-
tively the supplementary benefits ofthe workers. This is then operationally equivalent to
a policy whereby the boat owner is subsidized. As such, the foregoing analysis regarding
boat owner subsidies is also appropriate for labor subsidies.
In summary, the results suggest that extending the analysis of crop sharing to the
case of full bioeconomic industry equilibrium leads to several new insights into the
structure and stability of fisheries sharing contracts and market equilibrium. In particu-
lar, the choice of contract is not a matter of indifference to the contracting parties.
Higher employment sharing contracts will always be adopted despite the fact that, ulti-Crop Sharing in Fishery and Industry Equilibrium 189
matety, they do not improve profitability. The employment increases come, however, at
the expense of a reduced resource population and resulting higher average costs of
harvesting that accompany lower resource stock levels.'"
Contracts Within Regulated Industries
Most fisheries are subject to regulation, often in the form of quotas and/or licenses
provided to a fixed number of firms. Regulation, in general, leads to economic rents
for firms remaining in the industry. In this section we show that the benefits associated
with these rents depend on the choice of contract and that the contract scheme that
generates the greater utility for boat owners may be either a share contract or a wage
contract. Like the results discussed previously, however, even if the wage contract
dominates, it may not be adopted. Factors that infiuence which contract is preferred by
boat owners include the elasticity of market demand, the sensitivity of extraction costs
to the size of the available resource stock, and properties of the resource growth
dynamics.
Licenses
With this type of regulation, a fixed number of boats (n) is allowed to remain in the
industry. These boats are unrestricted with respect to output decisions. The utility of a
representative boat owner is given by:
V = p{,nq)q - c(q, x) - p\nq)c^a]fXBr* (33)
Equation (33) is similar to Eq. (10) but is expressed in terms of a cost function and
output. Individual firms maximize profits treating price as fixed, thereby leading to the
following first- and second-order conditions:
p(nq) - c, - 2p\nq)qa]fiiBr* = 0 (34)
- C,, - 2p\nq)ala,r* < 0 (35)
Einally, industry equilibrium will depend on the growth constraint
g{x) - nq = 0 (36)
In this situation a bioeconomic equilibrium is defined by the values [q*, x*] satisfying
Eqs. (34), (35), and (36). In general, [q*, x*] will depend on r*, which, it will be
recalled, takes the value 1 for wage contracts and aj{a^ + a^) for crop-sharing con-
tracts. Furthermore, the maximized utility of the boat owner, V*(r*), is obtained by
evaluating the right-hand side of Eq. (33) at (q*, x*). The socially optimal contract
structure when industry effects are incorporated is determined by comparing the wage-
contract with crop-sharing utility levels, respectively given by V(r =1) and
V*{r = ag/{aB + (Xc)). It is useful to begin this comparison by examining the effect on
the boat owner's equilibrium utility of increasing r relative to the crop-sharing equilib-













where 77 is the market elasticity of demand and is negative. Thus, the change in utility
can be decomposed into three effects: an output effect, a resource effect, and a risk
effect. Assuming that the equilibrium is stable, the resource effect (- dc/dx* dx*ldr*)
will always be positive. Similarly, the risk effect (- a]p^inq*)q*^a^ is always negative.
The sign of the output effect depends upon the sign of dq*ldr*, which, for a stable
equilibrium, depends on the presence of biological inefficiency. If there is no biological
inefficiency, that is, if g' < 0, then the output effect will be positive.
Equation (37) and the above discussion, although suggestive of the fact that the
crop-sharing equilibrium may not be socially optimal, do not strictly establish that crop
sharing will ever be inferior to a wage contract. (Observe that if dV*ldr* > 0, the
owner would prefer a wage contract, and conversely, with a negative sign, he would
prefer sharing.) We introduce the following example to illustrate a case where crop
sharing is the socially less desirable contract.
Example 1
Consider the following specification of production, growth, and demand functions.
f(L, x) = Lx => c(q, x; w) = wq/x
piriq) = inq)-'
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Note that whenever relative risk attitudes are such that r* < 5/8, it follows that.*:* < .5,
which implies that biological inefficiency arises. Regardless of this inefficiency, how-
ever, r = 1 (i.e., the wage-contract case), characterizes the socially optimal contract in
the sense that utility of the boat owners with the wage contract is 2/25 and is thus greater
than any crop-sharing altemative. An interesting situation arises when both owner and
crew have the same risk-aversion parameter and hence r* = .5. In this case, the output
per boat is the same under both contracting schemes, but the wage contract yields twice
the utility to the boat owner because it is associated with a greater resource stock and
thus a lower extraction cost.
A final important point that is highlighted by this example is the fact that the wage
contract, although socially preferable, need not be privately optimal. That is, the wage
contract may not be a Nash market equilibrium. To see that this is true, it suffices to
show that the marginal profits to a crop-sharing firm at the wage equilibrium values is
positive. Choose, for example, a^ = a^ = 2 so that r* = .5, x* = 2/5, q* = 6/125,
and piq*) = 25/6 in the above example. By substituting these values into the left-hand
side of Eq. (34), we find that the expression is positive and equal to 1. Thus, at this
point, crop-sharing firms would want to increase output. In fact, it is optimal for them
all to do so. The result will be that the stock size, x, declines, thus causing costs to
increase.
Licenses and Individual Quotas
In the foregoing discussion, regulation affected the number of firms in the industry but
not the output choices of these firms. An alternative and more restrictive regulation
scheme would involve placing individual output quotas on these firms as well. It may be
argued that in such a case, crop sharing would dominate given that, from Eq. (33), crop-
sharing firms will have a smaller r and hence, ceteris paribus, a greater utility level than
a wage-contract firm. The flaw with this argument, however, is that the regulatory
agency, although choosing the number of firms and quotas per firm in a socially optimal
fashion, may not take account of the existing market contract scheme. Typically, regula-
tion of the industry has taken place as if there were only wage contracts. This may be
justifiable, as Anderson (1982, 448) suggested in a deterministic environment. However,
in the stochastic case, if the licensed firms adopt crop-sharing contracts, society may still
be worse off than if they had chosen wage contracts. To illustrate this point, we refer to
Example 1 and assume that the government chooses to license five firms, each with a
quota of 6/125 units. If boat owners and crew have similar preferences (r* = .5), then
the regulated industry will adopt a crop-sharing contract with a resource size of 2/5 and
utility per boat of 1/25, whereas they could have had a utility of 2/25 if the resource
stock had been allowed to grow to 4/5, as would happen under a wage contract. Once
again, the socially optimal contract will not be reached by private firms.
Summary and Conclusions
It has been argued in the resource economics literature that crop-sharing contracts will
dominate wage contracts in a stochastic environment and that output and employment
will both be greater. In this article we have examined these arguments in the more
complete setting of bioeconomic equilibrium. We have shown that privately optimal
sharing contracts in fisheries are not, in general, socially optimal. As well, output and
employment differences between socially and privately optimal contracts are ambiguous192 C. Plourde and J. B. Smith
because of ttieir dependence on the characteristics of the resource growth equilibrium.
These resutts hotd true even when the industries are subject to conventional forms of
regulation in terms of licenses and/or quotas.
In addition to providing a more complete characterization of optimal contracting in
resource industries, the results of this research have important implications for optimal
regulation. In particular, the regulator must design policy subject to the constraint that
private firms will have an incentive to adopt a particular contract form. Furthermore,
such implicit contract incentives may reduce the net benefits of implementing the regula-
tory policy. An interesting and important open question, then, involves the determination
of the optimal regulatory policy that provides firms with the appropriate incentives to
adopt the socially optimal labor contract.
Notes
1. An interesting earty discussion of ttie observed range of contract types can be found in
Zoeteweij (1956). Pure wage contracts have been reemerging in some Canadian (Great Lakes and
Newfoundland) and New Zealand fisheries (personal communication. Dr. T. Cowan, Department
of Fisheries and Oceans, Ottawa).
2. The situation that arises is much tike a prisoners' dilemma game.
3. This approach simplifies the exposition of the results and allows us to focus attention on
the contracting issues.
4. The fact that the optimal shares (r*, 1-r*) ratios depend solely on risk-preference parame-
ters may be used to explain the observation that in many fisheries, these shares are relatively
constant over time. See Anderson (1982), Hodgson (1957), and footnote 5 in Ferris and Plourde
(1982) regarding time profiles of shares.
5. We use the term employment here to represent optimal man-hours in fishing. The
employer/employee distinction in a sharing contract is blurred because, to some extent, the crew
member is self-employed. This has been a source of difficulty for determining eligibility for social
assistance (welfare) programs. In Canada, crew members are eligible for unemployment insurance
benefits. For details, see Zoeteweij (1956) and Ferris and Plourde (1982).
6. For industry modets of fishing in a deterministic environment, see Smith (1974), Quirk
and Smith (1970), Anderson (1976), and Hartwick (1982).
7. The Routh-Hurwitz conditions can be found in Gantmacher (1959) or Takayama (1974).
8. See V. L. Smith (1974) for a complete comparison of the cases g' < 0 and g' > 0. If
g' > 0, then from Eqs. (17) to (20), p —Ikp^q = dc/dq, which is positive. By multiplying both
sides by q/p it follows that (p - Ikp^q) is also positive. Hence |7| will depend on magnitudes of
the variables and parameters.
9. In 1986-1987 the United States Federal Trade Commission argued that Canadian subsi-
dies (such as for boat building) have given Canadian fisheries an unfair competitive advantage.
So-called corrective countervailing duties have been imposed on various Canadian fish products
sold in the United States.
10. Observe that the assumption that variance does not depend on the size of AT significantly
simplifies the analysis. If, for instance, uncertainty results from search (a common problem in fish
harvesting), then stock effects are much more complicated. We suggest this as a problem for
further research.
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